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NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH:
MANAGEMENT'S OBLIGATION




International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
v. Transportes Aereos Mercantiles Pan Americandos, S.A.
I. INTRODUCTION
When an employer and employee-representative union engage in collective
bargaining negotiations, their negotiating activities are covered under the auspices
of the Railway Labor Act.2 The Act, particularly applicable today in the
tumultuous airline industry, established a rather elaborate mechanism for
negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation to avoid
interruptions to interstate commerce, to protect employees' freedom of association
with respect to labor unions, and to provide prompt and orderly dispute
settlements.3 Indispensable to this scheme, Section 152, First of the Act imposes
a statutory obligation upon the parties to such negotiations to bargain in good
faith.4 In International Ass 'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Transportes
Aereos Mercantiles Pan Americandos, S.A., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the RLA precluded the airline from making
unilateral changes in working conditions at the outset of collective bargaining
negotiations in that to hold otherwise would be to allow the airline an
unbargained-for advantage against its counterpart union.5 This Note examines
to what extent the duty imposed by Section 2, First affects the relative positions
of the negotiating parties and how the goals of the Act were affected by the
court's holding.
1. 924 F.2d 1005 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 167 (1991) [hereinafter Tampa Airlines].
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988) [hereinafter RLA].
3. See General Comm. of Adjustment of Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R.,
320 U.S. 323, 328-33 (1943); RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 151a.
4. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First [hereinafter Section 2, First].
5. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1009.
1
Dade: Dade: Negotiating in Good Faith:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellee, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM), was elected on July 15, 1987, to succeed the Teamsters Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative for fleet service employees of appellant,
Transportes Aereos Mercantiles Pan Americandos (Tampa Airlines). 6 Collective
bargaining during the Teamsters' tenure as the airline's employees' representative
produced a tentative agreement regarding pay rates, rules, and working
conditions. 7 Notwithstanding that the tentative agreement was never finalized or
ratified, at the October 2, 1987 initiation of bargaining between IAM and Tampa
Airlines, the airline informed IAM that the Teamsters' agreement contained the
existing pay rates, rules, and working conditions, in other words, the "status
quo".'
In May 1988, while engaged in collective bargaining with IAM, Tampa
Airlines fired several IAM employees without regard to previously existing
seniority rules and advised IAM that no grievance procedure existed to challenge
its actions.9 In the same month, the airline fired the shop steward, "allegedly on
the grounds that, although he was a good employee, his position with the union
would not be tolerated and that management would not respect the union nor its
members' rights. "'10
IAM responded by filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, alleging bad faith on the part of Tampa Airlines
associated with the ongoing collective bargaining negotiations." Collective
bargaining continued between the parties despite the litigation until January 1989,
when the airline refused to continue the negotiations. 2 Subsequently, Tampa
Airlines made additional unilateral modifications, including stopping without
notification contributions it had heretofore made to the IAM employees' dependent
group medical insurance coverage, decreasing certain employee bonuses,
decreasing flight crews, increasing flights per day, and laying off more
6. Id. at 1006. Tampa Airlines is a "common carrier by air" as defined by the RLA, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151, 181.
7. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1006.
8. Id. In its brief to the court of appeals, Tampa Airlines defined "status quo" as a term defined
by a floating definition in "that rates of pay, rules and working conditions were changed by
management at its discretion to meet Tampa's needs." Id. n.2 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 4, 11,
Tampa Airlines (No. 89-5912)). The circuit court, however, chose instead to accept the district court's
ruling that Tampa Airlines' management had informed tAM that the unratified Teamsters' agreement
represented the existing working conditions, therefore setting the terms of the Teamsters' unratified
agreement as the status quo. Id. The circuit court stated that it upheld the district court's definition
because Tampa Airlines chose not to contend on appeal that the lower court's definition was in error.
Id.
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employees. 3 IAM thereupon amended its original complaint to include these
additional changes. '
4
Relying on Section 2, First of the RLA, the district court granted a
preliminary injunction in favor of IAM, enjoining Tampa Airlines from making
unilateral changes in working conditions during collective bargaining negotiations
as well as ordering the airline to restore the working conditions to the "status
quo" before certain unilateral changes were made.' 5
Tampa Airlines appealed, arguing: (1) that the district court misapplied the
RLA and the supporting case law, and (2) that the injunction was an inappropriate
remedy.' 6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's order enjoining Tampa Airlines from making further unilateral
changes as well as restoring the pre-existing conditions. 7 The court held, inter
alia, that when management, while participating in collective bargaining under the
RLA, unilaterally changes existing working conditions after negotiations with the




In 1926, Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act. ' Section 2, First of the
Act provides that:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees
to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all
disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or
otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the
operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier
and the employees thereof."
13. Id. at 1006-07.
14. Id. at 1007.
15. Id. at 1006. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit court's
treatment of "status quo" and the district court's definition of the term.
16. Id. Tampa Airlines also contended at oral argument that the district court erred by failing
to fix a bond. Id. at 1011 n.10. The circuit court declined to address that issue, holding that the
airline did not adequately address the issue in its brief. Id.
17. Id. at 1011.
18. Id. at 1010. The court also held that any collective bargaining agreement that might issue
from such negotiations "would almost surely be the product of decreased union bargaining strength."
Id. at 1011. Accordingly, the court found that an injunction such as that issued by the district court
was "the only practical and effective remedy here." Id.
19, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188.
20. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First.
1992]
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In its preface to the RLA, Congress expressed, inter alia, the following purposes:
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions [and] . . . to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing
out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."
The duty imposed by Section 2, First comprises "[t]he heart of the
[RLA] ."22 Accordingly, Section 2, First has been held to impose a legal
obligation upon management and labor that is judicially enforceable. 23  In
Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, 4 the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois faced a matter where the
railroad sought an injunction to enforce the union's Section 2, First duty to
bargain after the union threatened to strike when the parties exhausted formal
RLA procedures.25 In an unreported opinion, the district court ruled: (1) that
the railroad's complaint that the union had failed to perform its obligation under
Section 2, First to "exert every reasonable effort" to maintain the status quo
regarding pay rates and working conditions26 was nonjusticiable and was,
instead, a matter for determination by the National Mediation Board; 7 and (2)
that Sections 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act28 deprived the court of
jurisdiction to enjoin the union's threatened strike.29
21. 45 U.S.C. § 151a. The act further expresses the additional purposes:
(1) [t]o avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged
therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any
denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a
labor organization; [and] (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of
employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter.
Id.
22. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377 (1969).
23. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 577 (1971).
24. 402 U.S. 570.
25. Id. at 570.
26. The union counterclaimed that it had, in fact, complied with Section 2, First, but that the
railroad had been derelict in its duty under the section. Id. at 572 n.3.
27. Id. at 572.
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107 (1988).
29. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 572. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act reads, in
relevant part:
No court . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment
29 U.S.C. § 104.
4
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,3 ° interpreting
Section 2, First as a general statement of the policies and purposes of the
subsequent sections of the RLA and not as a specific requirement anticipating
judicial enforcement. 3' Rather, the circuit court reasoned, the enforcement of
Section 2, First was within the exclusive domain of the National Mediation
Board.32
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider what Justice Harlan,
delivering the majority opinion reversing the lower courts,33 considered to be an
important question under the RLA on which the lower courts, heretofore, had
expressed disparate views.' The Court majority expressly held that Section 2,
First was intended to be more than merely a policy statement. 35  Rather, the
Court determined, the statute was "designed to be a legal obligation, enforceable
by whatever appropriate means might be developed on a case-by-case basis."
36
The Chicago & North Western Court justified its conclusion primarily on the
testimony of Donald R. Richberg, counsel for the organized railway employees
supporting the RLA, given in 1926 before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. 37 In his testimony, Richberg stated, "it is [the parties'] duty
to exert every reasonable effort ... to settle all disputes, whether arising out of
the abrogation of agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce. In other words, the legal obligation is imposed .... ,,31
30. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 985-88.
32. Id.
33. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 572-73. The Court split, 5-4, in its opinion with Justices
Black, Douglas, and White joining Justice Brennan in dissent. Id. at 584.
34. Id. at 573. In addition to the lower courts' decisions in the matter before the court, Justice
Harlan referred to the following cases: Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 416 F.2d
633 (4th Cir. 1969); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt Railroad, 385 F.2d
581 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers., 425 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir.
1970); and United Industrial Workers v. Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968). See
Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 573 n.4.
35. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 577.
36. Id. In a strong dissent, wherein he painstakingly summarized the legislative history of the
enactment of the RLA, Justice Brennan interpreted the majority's decision to mean,
in essence .... that a district court has the duty under § 2 First, to assess the bargaining
tactics of each of the parties after the entire statutory scheme has run its course. If, then,
the court determines that a party had not exerted sufficient effort to reach settlement, it
should enjoin self-help measures, and, if such action is to make any sense within this
statutory scheme, remand the parties to some unspecified point in the bargaining process.
Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Such a notion, Justice Brennan concluded,
was "entirely contrary to the carefully constructed premise of the [RLA]." Id.
37. Id. at 576-77.
38. Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180) Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1926). However, Mr. Richberg also testified that
this is not a duty which would be enforced in a ver, absolute way, because it is a duty
to exert every reasonable effort. In other words, all that could be enforced by the court
would be an order against an arbitrary refusal to even attempt to comply with that duty
1992]
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One may also look past the Court's Chicago & North Western decision to
find support for the proposition that Section 2, First is meant to sustain the status
quo among the parties involved. Earlier, the Court held in Detroit & Toledo
Shore Line Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union3 9 that Section 2, First,
together with other RLA provisions, "form[s] an integrated, harmonious scheme
for preserving the status quo.
"4°
When determining whether a party has met its Section 2, First obligation "to
exert every effort to make ...agreements," 4' it is not enough for the parties
to jump through all of the RLA's hoops; bargaining must "at all stages" be
governed by a party's sincere desire to reach an agreement.42  The Supreme
Court's holding in Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.43 establishes the
starting point for examining whether Section 2, First precludes management from
making unilateral changes in working conditions after the commencement of
negotiations directed toward adoption of an initial collective bargaining
agreement."
In Williams, no collective bargaining agreement existed when a new union
became certified.4" In light of this situation, the new union requested to
negotiate an initial agreement, including the accounting for and disposition of
employees' tips.46 Despite this request, management unilaterally changed the
method for employees to account for their tips.47 The Court concluded that the
carrier was permitted, pending negotiations where no collective bargaining
agreements were or had been in effect, to make unilateral changes.48 The status
quo provisions of the RLA, including Section 2, Seventh, the Court reasoned,
Id. at 85.
39. 396 U.S. 142 (1969). See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Detroit & Toledo decision.
40. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 152.
41. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 402 (1942).
42. See generally American Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Roger H. Briton, Airline Collective Bargaining Under the Railway Labor Act: The
Management Perspective, C656 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 113 (Oct. 17, 1991). One court has expressly held
that if a party has failed to negotiate in good faith, therefore tainting each step of the RLA process,
the parties involved should be required to "revisit each step [negotiation, mediation, etc.] in a good
faith effort to settle their dispute." Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 471 F.2d 366,
369 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 917 (1973).
43. 315 U.S. 386.
44. Id. at 399.
45. Id. at 402.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Court held that
[b]ecause the carrier was [by the RLA] placed under the duty to exert every effort to
make collective agreements, it does not follow that, pending those negotiations, where
no collective bargaining agreements are or have been in effect, the carrier cannot exercise
its authority to arrange its business relations with its employees ....
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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were meant to prevent working condition changes "previously fixed by collective
bargaining agreements. "4 9
However, the Supreme Court later severely restricted the Williams holding
in Detroit & Toledo, where the carrier sought to enjoin the union from striking
and the union counterclaimed to prevent the carrier from violating the RLA's
status quo provisions by establishing new outlying work assignments. 5" In
Detroit & Toledo, where a previous collective bargaining agreement was in place
when management made unilateral changes to working conditions not expressly
covered by the agreement, Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that the
RLA's status quo provisions obligate both parties to maintain not only those
working conditions contained in the existing agreement, but also "those actual,
objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in
effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or
related to that dispute."51 The majority expressly added that these conditions
need not have been covered in the initial agreement.52 An employer would be
able to make such changes, the Court concluded, only if those changes had
occurred for a "sufficient period of time with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the employees to become in reality a part of the actual working conditions. "3
The Court based its conclusion on the rationale that if the carrier was
allowed to resort to self-help before exhausting the RLA's negotiation and
mediation procedures, "the union [could not] be expected to hold back its own
economic weapons, including the strike."54 Justice Black further explained that
the immediate effect of the RLA's status quo provisions (including Section 2,
First) would be not only to prevent strikes but also to provide time for more
amicable and constructive resolutions to labor disputes.55 Justice Black also
added that the RLA was useful in compelling a compromise between two
disputing parties.56
Support for Justice Black's rationale can be found in one commentator's
discussion of a similar duty to bargain in good faith under the auspices of the
National Labor Relations Act57: "Unilateral changes made while the employees'
representative is seeking to bargain .. . interfere with the normal course of
49. Id. at 403.
50. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 144-45; see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
51. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 153.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id. at 150.
56. Id. In so doing, Justice Black wrote, "[T]he power which the Act gives the other party to
preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will frequently make it worth-while for the moving
party to compromise with the interests of the other side and thus reach agreement without interruption
to commerce." Id.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) [hereinafter NLRA].
1992]
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negotiations by weakening the union's bargaining position." 8 In its Chicago &
North Western decision, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of such
rationale, as illustrated by its holding in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International
Union,"9 that "the duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a
corollary of its duty to recognize the union. "'
The Detroit & Toledo Court distinguished the Williams decision as one
applying only to a situation where there was no pre-existing collective bargaining
agreement." By so doing, the Court even limited Williams' allowance of
unilateral changes to the narrow situation of not only where there is no pre-
existing collective bargaining agreement, but also where there is "absolutely no
prior history of any collective bargaining."I
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in announcing
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Trans World Airlines,63 recognized that the
Detroit & Toledo distinguishment "certainly casts some doubt on the continuing
willingness of the Supreme Court to follow the Williams precedent" in cases not
factually distinct from it.' However, the D.C. Circuit noted that Detroit &
Toledo "plainly stops short of overruling" Williams and held that the Williams
rationale was left binding in situations similar to that described in TWA where
there was no history of prior collective bargaining or agreement between the
carrier and the union on any matter. 65
The TWA court noted finally, after examining both Detroit & Toledo and
Chicago & North Western, that Williams was not dead, though it was
weakened.' The court further found that the independent duty for the parties
to bargain in good faith, as found by Chicago & North Western, was limited and
noted that the Supreme Court there held that injunctive remedy would be available
58. Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (1958).
Cox also noted that it is "not enough for the law to compel the parties to meet and treat without
passing judgment upon the quality of the negotiations. The bargaining status of a union can be
destroyed by going through the motions of negotiating almost as easily as by bluntly withholding
recognition." Id. at 1413.
59. 361 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1960).
60. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 575 (citing Insurance Agents' Int'l, 361 U.S. at 484-85).
61. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 158.
62. Id.
63. 839 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.) [hereinafter TWA], amended on other grounds, 848 F.2d 232 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988).
64. Id. at 814. The court here was considering the specific Detroit & Toledo language which
stated that
[i]n Williams there was absolutely no prior history of any collective bargaining or
agreement between the parties on any matter. Without pausing to comment upon the
present vitality of either of these grounds for dismissing the . .. [RLA] claim [in
Williams] it is readily apparent that Williams involved only the question of whether the
status quo requirement of § 6 applied .
Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 158.
65. TWA, 839 F.2d at 814.
66. Id.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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only "where a strike injunction is the only practical, effective means of enforcing
the command of [Section] 2 First."'67
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concurred with the TWA
decision in determining Regional Airline Pilots v. Wings West Airlines.6" There,
as in the D.C. Circuit, the parties involved had undertaken no steps toward
bargaining, mediation, or other means provided by the RLA to assist the
bargaining process. 69  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit that
federal court interjection into the bargaining process was not authorized by
Section 2, First, as had been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Williams and
in Chicago & North Western. 70 However, this circuit distinguished itself from
the D.C. Circuit in that "our view is that jurisdiction exists to enforce [Section]
2 First through Fourth, but that the prerequisites for stating a claim under
authority of [Chicago & North Western] do not exist under the facts of this case
where there has been no negotiation process instituted at all.""'
Guidance for the Ninth Circuit's Wings West decision may be found based,
in part, upon its earlier announcement in Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International v.
Transamerica Airlines, Inc.72 In response to the airline's contention that the
union failed to allege a violation of Section 2, First, the court held that the
airline's underlying activity alleged by the union violated the tenets of Section 2,
First that carriers must "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle
all disputes." 73 Therefore, the court concluded, the union complaint stated a
Section 2, First claim for which relief could be properly granted by a federal
court. 
7 4
More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
reviewing a lower court's dismissal of a union's counterclaim that an airline
violated the "every reasonable effort" provision of Section 2, First by unilaterally
altering rates of pay, held in Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation
67. Id. (citing Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 582).
68. Regional Airline Pilots v. Wings W. Airlines, 915 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.




72. 817 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987). In this case, the pilots' union
brought suit against the airline alleging, inter alia, that Transamerica violated Section 2, First by
"formulat[ing] a plan to institute pay scales without the approval of [the union]" and "that to further
this plan, [the airline] entered into collective bargaining negotiation with [the union], but failed and
refused to exert reasonable efforts to reach agreement or bargain in good faith." Id. at 512.
73. Id. at 514 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152, First); see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text
(regarding the tenets of Section 2, First); see also Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 579 n. 11; Trans
Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 962 (9th Cir. 1980) ('The
Supreme Court in [Chicago & N. W Ry.] held that [Section 2, First) imposed a substantive duty on
parties, enforceable by injunctive relief, to exert reasonable efforts during the negotiation process to
reach an agreement.").
74. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 817 F.2d at 514.
19921
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Board75 that the district court properly dismissed the union's counterclaim
because there was no pre-existing bargaining relationship between the parties.76
In so holding, the Second Circuit noted that although some courts (specifically the
Tampa Airlines court) "have held that something less than a formalized collective
bargaining agreement may be sufficient to trigger the [RLA's] status quo
provisions" [including Section 2, First], in Virgin Atlantic, the Circuit could not
even find an unratified agreement between the parties.7 In fact, the court noted
that the union (International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline Division) and the
airline had never even bargained with each other.7" The Virgin Atlantic court
recognized similar decisions in TWA and Wings West where no steps toward
bargaining had been taken and the unilateral changes in payrates by the airline-
employers did not violate Section 2, First's duty to exert "every reasonable
effort. ,79
The analysis undertaken by a court when examining an alleged violation of
the Section 2, First bargaining obligation has been compared to a similar duty
imposed by the NRLA ° in response to an unfair labor practice alleging a party's
failure to bargain in good faith."' In interpreting the NLRA's duty to bargain
in good faith, the Supreme Court has held that where there has been no prior
collective bargaining agreement between management and the union, "an
employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is [as
much a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith] as . . . a flat refusal [to
negotiate]. "82 While there may be some basis for the proposition that Section
2, First generates a more stringent duty to bargain in good faith than is required
under the NLRA,"3 a more recent decision rejects this view.'
75. 956 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, the court was primarily concerned with determining
the validity of the certification of an employee representative under the RLA and the power of the
National Mediation Board under Section 2, Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth, to investigate and resolve
disputes among RLA-govemed employees as to the identity of their bargaining representative. Virgin
Atlantic, 956 F.2d at 1247.
76. Virgin Atlantic, 956 F.2d at 1247.
77. Id. at 1253 (citing Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1008-10).
78. Id. at 1253. Because the airline and the union here had never bargained with each other, the
Second Circuit held that Section 2, Seventh, as argued by the union, did not apply. Id. Section 2,
Seventh states, in part, that "[n]o carrier . . . shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed
in such agreements .... " 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh.
79. Virgin Atlantic, 956 F.2d at 1253 (citing Wings W., 915 F.2d at 1402-03; TWA, 839 F.2d
at 814-15).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 141; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
81. See Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 45
n.6 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
82. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
83. See REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, 358 F. Supp.
760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Briton, supra note 42.
84. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, 682 F. Supp. 1003,
1020-21 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aft'd, 878 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the court determined that the purposes of the RLA are
"facilitated by an elaborate statutory scheme designed to encourage negotiation
and mediation rather than conflict resulting in the interruption of interstate
commerce. "' Crucial to this plan, the court held, is the duty to bargain in good
faith, as codified in Section 2, First.86 The statute, the court concluded, is not
merely "horatory" but imposes "judicially enforceable legal obligations" on the
parties involved.87
The court also noted that IAM did not call upon the identical RLA provisions
invoked by the Detroit & Toledo union. 88 As a result, the court believed that
this distinction raised a question left unresolved by Detroit & Toledo: whether
the duty to bargain in good faith, as prescribed by Section 2, First, standing
alone, precluded unilateral changes after the commencement of negotiations.89
The Tampa Airlines court succinctly concluded that it did. 9°
Though the Williams decision, standing alone, might have required finding
the opposite result in Tampa Airlines, the court resolved that Detroit & Toledo
"limited Williams' allowance of unilateral changes to narrow the situation where
there is 'absolutely no prior history of any collective bargaining or agreement
between the parties on any matter.' -91 In the instant case, the Tampa Airlines
court noted that both collective bargaining between Tampa Airlines and the
Teamsters and the airline's subsequent bargaining with IAM had already occurred
when Tampa Airlines made the unilateral changes contested by IAM. 92  The
court further noted that when Tampa Airlines began the collective bargaining
procedure with IAM, the airline informed the union that the prior, unratified
Teamsters agreement represented the status quo. 93 By finding a prior history of
85. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1007.
86. Id.; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (detailing the purposes and provisions of
the statute).
87. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1007; see generally Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. 570.
88. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1008 n.5. In Detroit & Toledo, the union invoked Section 6 of
the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 156, which, along with Section 5, First and Section 10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155,
First, 160, constitutes the status quo portion of the RLA. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 150-51. The
Tampa Airlines court determined that it need not decide whether the tentative agreement between
Tampa Airlines and the Teamsters in the case at hand was a Section 6 agreement because it concluded
that Section 2, First preclude[d] the unilateral changes made.., despite the lack of a formal agreement
in light of the history of prior collective bargain[s] between the parties." Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d
at 1008 n.5 (emphasis added).
89. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1008. In Detroit & Toledo, the union argued that the railroad
had violated its RLA duty to bargain in good faith; the Court there declined to decide that argument
because it chose to resolve the case on the basis of Section 6. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 155
n.23.
90. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1008.
91. Id. (quoting Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 158) (alteration in original).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1008-09.
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collective bargaining, the court held that the case at hand did not fall within
Williams' "small window of remaining vitality. "94
Following its conclusion that Tampa Airlines was not controlled by the
language of Williams, and by holding instead that Detroit & Toledo narrowed the
scope of that decision, this court next found that the rationale of Detroit &
Toledo, coupled with the Chicago & North Western conclusion that Section 2,
First provided for legally enforceable duties, precluded the unilateral changes in
working conditions made in this instance by Tampa Airlines.' Although in the
instant case, there was no prior formal collective bargaining agreement between
Tampa Airlines and IAM (as between the parties in Detroit & Toledo), the court
determined that the instant case implicated the identical policies behind Detroit &
Toledo: "If management is permitted to make unilateral changes in working
conditions during collective bargaining, the union's position will be undermined,
interruptions to interstate commerce are likely to occur, and the purposes of the
Act will be frustrated. ' 6
The court rejected Tampa Airlines' argument that a prior collective
bargaining agreement must exist before management can be enjoined from
unilaterally changing working conditions.' In so rejecting the airline's reliance
on TWA, this circuit noted that the D.C. Circuit believed the facts in TWA fell
precisely within the remaining Williams "window of vitality" (i.e., no prior
collective bargaining and no prior agreement). 9 Williams, the Eleventh Circuit
found, was "expressly limited" by Detroit & Toledo to control only those
situations where there are not only no pre-existing agreements, but also no
histories of collective bargaining."
The Court also found support for its interpretation of the RLA's duty to
bargain in good faith by analogizing to a similar duty required by the NLRA.I °
94. Id. at t009. The court even noted that the Detroit & Toledo opinion questioned whether
Williams retained any vitality at this juncture but declined to address Williams' continuing validity after
determining that there was prior collective bargaining in the instant case. Id. (citing Detroit & Toledo,




98. Id. This court distinguished the TWA decision by noting that TWA held only that "Williams
[is] binding in a case like this one before us where there has been 'absolutely no prior history of
any collective bargaining or agreement between the parties on any matter."' Id. (citing TWA, 839
F.2d at 814 (quoting Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 158)).
99. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1009. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit seemed to be in
accord by negative inference with its determination that such unilateral changes in working conditions
could be enjoined when there has been some prior collective bargaining. Id. n.8 (citing Wings W.,
915 F.2d at 1403).
100. Id. at 1009 (citing NLRA § 141). In doing so, the court recognized that it could not import
the NLRA "wholesale" into RLA-governed negotiations and that it should exercise caution in drawing
even rough analogies. Id. (citing Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 383). However, the court
held that an analogy was appropriate since both labor acts require good-faith bargaining. td. (citing
Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Ry., 248 F.2d at 45 n.6).
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Affirming the opinion expressed by the Chicago & North Western court'0 ° that
the duty to bargain in good faith required by both acts is grounded in the same
underlying policy, the Tampa Airlines court held that "existing rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions must be maintained during negotiations because '[t]he
bargaining status of a union can be destroyed by going through the motions of
negotiating almost as easily as by bluntly withholding recognition' of the union
as the bargaining representative."" Similarly, the court held that Tampa
Airlines violated the duty to bargain in good faith under the RLA when it
unilaterally modified existing working conditions after the onset of collective
bargaining negotiations with IAM.° 3
V. COMMENT
By barring Tampa Airlines from enacting unilateral changes in working
conditions (consequently buttressing IAM's bargaining position), and therefore
denying the airline what would amount to an unbargained-for advantage, the
Eleventh Circuit seemed to operate under the belief that Detroit & Toledo stands
for the proposition that parties to collective bargaining negotiations should
function from relatively equal bargaining positions. " However, the question
remains whether the court exercised the correct analysis in determining whether
to protect the status quo.
In order to reach its belief, the Tampa Airlines court first had to trigger the
mechanism that it could use to restrict the Williams rationale, which, if followed,
would preclude unilateral changes by the airline only in the face of any previous
or current collective bargaining agreements between the parties at hand." In
this matter, there was no collective bargaining agreement ratified between IAM
and Tampa Airlines. " Therefore, at first blush, it would appear that Williams
would apply in this matter to allow Tampa Airlines to make unilateral
changes. 07
However, because the airline itself informed IAM at the outset of
negotiations that the previous tentative Teamsters agreement contained the existing
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, Detroit & Toledo provided that
limiting mechanism in that it disallows unilateral changes in effect prior to the
time of the pending dispute which are involved in or related to the dispute. 
10 8
101. See Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 574-75.
102. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1010 (citing Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 574-75).
Drawing on this analogy to the NLRA, the court was persuaded by similar logic that the U.S.
Supreme Court employed in Katz to interpret the NLRA duty to bargain in good faith. Id. (citing
Katz, 369 U.S. at 743).
103. Id.
104. See Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 155.
105. See Williams, 315 U.S. at 403.
106. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1006.
107. See Williams, 315 U.S. 402.
108. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d at 1008; see Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 153.
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In the alternative, because the Eleventh Circuit was able to find a history of
collective bargaining at some point prior to the dispute at hand, it would seem that
the circuit would favor the rationale advanced by Williams in situations where
there was no prior history of any sort of collective bargaining, (attempted,
tentative, or ratified) upon which a status quo label could be attached."9
What is management's (or any party's) obligation to bargain in good faith
under Section 2, First? The RLA seems to impose upon the parties an obligation
to make every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement and to refrain from
altering the status quo by resorting to self-help measures while the Act's remedies
are being exhausted. "0 As the Supreme Court noted in Brotherhood of Railway
& Steamship Clerks v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., "the procedures of
the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and
practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the
dispute.""' By allowing Detroit & Toledo to restrict unilateral modifications
by Tampa Airlines, this court seems to adopt wholeheartedly the rationale favored
by Justice Black in Detroit & Toledo that the RLA's status quo provisions
(including Section 2, First) would provide time for peaceful and productive
resolutions of labor disputes." 3
By prohibiting unilateral changes by the airline, the RLA provisions
consequently delay when the union can counteract with self-help measures such
as strikes or work slow-downs, thereby providing time for "tempers to cool" and
"[help] create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur." 114 The
result of removing one arrow from the quiver of a negotiating party who seeks
to change the status quo without delay or additional negotiation is constructively
to empower the other party to maintain the status quo throughout collective
bargaining negotiations, which Justice Black believed would "make it worthwhile
for the moving party [Tampa Airlines] to compromise with the interests of the
other side and thus reach agreement without interruption to commerce."" 5
By forcing the parties to sit at the bargaining table in reasonably equal
bargaining positions, each side is bolstered in the knowledge that the other cannot
independently change the dimensions of the playing field during the course of
collective bargaining negotiations. Even if an agreement does not prevent an
employer from conceiving and implementing certain decisions, it is prohibited
109. In fact, the Tampa Airlines court explicitly chose not to address the continuing validity of
Williams because it could not be found to apply to the facts under review. Tampa Airlines, 924 F.2d
at 1009 n.7.
110. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 394 U.S. at 378.
111. 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
112. Id. at 246.
113. See Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 150.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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from doing so once negotiated bargaining begins concerning the disputed
decision." 6 Only if, at the commencement of negotiated bargaining, it has
become an established practice for the employer to make such decisions without
any union reaction, should the employer proceed unfettered with its decision to
make unilateral working condition changes." 7
At this point, one must examine the resultant impact upon the union - and,
by extension, its role as negotiator for those employees whom it represents at the
bargaining table - following the adoption by the airline of unilateral changes.
IAM was in the position of acting as the advocate of Tampa Airlines' employees;
they placed their trust in the union to negotiate a reasonable and beneficial
agreement regarding pay rates, rules, and working conditions. By firing union
employees, decreasing benefits, and changing working conditions to the detriment
of the employees while at the same time engaging in negotiations with the union
regarding those issues, the airline seemed to telegraph the message that it did not
respect the employees.
If the airline did not respect the union's members, how could it possibly
respect the union's position at the bargaining table as the advocate representative
of those same employees? In order to negotiate an effective settlement or
working condition agreement, both parties must appreciate and recognize the
legitimacy of their counterparts and of their counterparts' interests in order to
reach a reasonable, equitable agreement."' Tampa Airlines appeared not to
respect the union or its members, and therefore IAM could not operate effectively
as the employees' advocate representative. As Archibald Cox wrote, "[t]he
bargaining status of a union can be destroyed by going through the motions of
negotiating almost as easily as by bluntly withholding recognition."9
Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Tampa Airlines, parties entering
into RLA negotiations should note carefully the collective bargaining history
between the carrier and its employees. Today, it would appear that if there has
been some history of prior collective bargaining, then, following the Detroit &
Toledo limitation of Williams, any unilateral changes in working conditions can
be enjoined. The parties are only free to modify working conditions unilaterally
when there has been absolutely no prior history of collective bargaining, not only
between the parties at hand but also between the carrier and any other similar
representative unions in the past. By allowing an equitable remedy for such
changes, the courts appear to be upholding the tenets of the RLA which promote
the rationale that the parties should approach the bargaining table in good faith in
116. See generally Athanassios Papaioannou, The Employer's Duty to Bargain Over Lay-offs in
the Airline Industry: How the Courts Have Distorted the Railway Labor Act, 55 J. AIR L. & COM.
939 (1990).
117. See generally id. But see Justice Harlan's dissent in Detroit & Toledo where he proposes
the unlikelihood that the RLA was meant to require two parties to remain at the same historical point
merely because one party does not wish to change. Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 159-61 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
118. See Cox, supra note 58, at 1413.
119. Id. at 1412-13.
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order to negotiate from relatively equal positions. Because of the continuance of
this limitation and the removal of the option to make unilateral changes under
most fact patterns, parties will now find themselves constructively forced into
engaging in rational bargaining with their counterparts in order to reach
agreements addressing the needs of both parties.
V. CONCLUSION
By its holding, the Tampa Airlines court extended the status quo rationale
advanced by Detroit & Toledo to determine that Section 2, First's duty to bargain
in good faith, standing alone, precluded unilateral changes in working conditions
after negotiations have commenced. In so holding, the court removed a
potentially contentious self-help arrow from the battle quiver of both parties in
that by barring management from making such unilateral working condition
changes, the union now should have one less potential reason to counteract with
self-help measures which would only result in interruptions to interstate
commerce. With this issue judicially predetermined, both parties can now
approach the negotiating table confident in the nature of the status quo from which
they may commence the negotiating process without the additional apprehension
to look over their shoulders.
JAY M. DADE
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